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--------------
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Case No. 
: 11260 
ANTHONY MONTOYA, . . 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
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--------------
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Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding. 
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Plaintiff·--Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 
11260 
AN'THONY MONTOYA I 
: 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STA'l'EMENT OF Nl\TURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Anthony Montoya, ap-
peals froru a conviction of robbery. 
DISPOS I'l'ION IN THE LOl1iTER COURrr 
The appellant was charged with and 
co11victed by a jury of robbery. The Honor-
a}J) r:' R:cya11 L H. Croft imposed the statutory 
-1 rH]ei crn1inatc sentence of not less than 
five years and vd1jcb may be for life. 
RELIEF SOUGil'l' ON l\PPEAL 
Hesponc1ent seeks af f irmancc of the 
judgment of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STArrEMENT OF FACTS 
Late in the evening of January 30, 
1967, three men entered a tavern at 706 
South State Street in Salt Lake City. 
While one of the men stood at the door 
holding a gun on the owner, the two others 
approached the ovmer and one of them struck 
him, then ordered him to lie on the floor. 
'l'he other Oi->ened the cash register and re-
moved $135.00. The three then fled (R.45-
:>J) ' 
Subsequently, the tavern owner identi-
Li ec1 dppcLlant from a photograph, and later 
}lid~('<1 <1ppclL1.11t out i11 a linc-·up, indi-
Cd L j n(.J i.. hdt lie' Vht:C; one: of the men who had 
rol_,])ed him tlncc dciys earlier (R.73). 
Appellant was represented at trial by 
a competent attorney who had been a member 
of the bdr for seven years, and who had 
extensive experience in the trial of crim-
inal cases. Three witnesses, as well as 
the appellant himself, testified in appel-
lant's behalf that he had been at home at 
the time of the robbery. However, the jury, 
in its discretion, chose not to believe the 
alibi defense and returned a verdict of 
siuilty. 
POIN'.I' I 
APPELLJ\H'J' WAS NO'l1 D8N1ED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASS IS'l'l\NCE C>l' coun:;:r~L IN THt~ CONDUCT OF HIS 
f>l:FEW3 l: • 
4 
1'hc fundzuu('nt<:11 privilege of an ac-
cu~_;e:·cl to the effective Llssistancc of coun-· 
scl in the conduct of his defense is well 
established in our system of law. Powell 
v .:.. j\ -l<?:.~ >~irJl:1:.1 2 8 7 U • S • 4 5 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ; S t ate v • 
F0.Ell§~lQ!.'.:th, 13 Utah 2d 103, 368 P. 2d 914 
(1962). This court has recognized that 
the right to effective representation en-
titles an accused to r8presentation by a 
reputable member of the bar who is in a 
position honestly and conscientiously to 
r~prcsent his interests, State v. Farns-
~2.!_th_, s~1pra, and who "shows a willingness 
to idcnljfy himself with the inte.cests of 
the defendant and present such defenses 
as arc available to him undc~ the law and 
conEdstent with the ethics of the; profes-
s.ion. 11 ['.J~.,!~_y_.! ___ 'l~~I1-~_r, Sup. Ct. Ut ab, 
No. ll?.07 (.Jan. 3, 1969). 
d<' f ( i iud n L \).; s c.1 ~:3 scr tcc1 l he i ncornpc t cncc of 
h_i ~:; tr ia.l counsc 1 cffL' leq ion, and from these 
cases the follov1in9 principles emerge: In 
order for the dcf cnse of an accused to be 
deemed constitutionally inadequate, an ex-
trcme case must be disclosed, Maye v. Pres-
~' 162 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1947), so that 
counsel's lack of diligence or competence 
amounted to no representation at all, People 
~Ie~_E._en~, 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N .E. 2d 231 
(1955), and reduced the trial to a farce or 
a sham. Cross v. U.S., 392 F.2d 360 (8th 
Cir. 1968); Cardarella v. U.S., 375 F.2d 
Ca1.2d '160, 386 P.2d 487 (1963); People v. 
The burden of establishing ineffective 
trial representation is aJw~ys upon the de-
f~nu~nt, for duly appointed members of the 
l1zir d.r c p-1~c~-;umcc1 to be cornpctcnt to act for 
tlw (lc:[e11sc :in a criminu_l cusc. Michel v. 
y _ _._J1?-1-=1::~?Jl~'\', 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967) 
Wo_ 1 t z, J.n_()_~1eguac_y_____2-:f 'J'_f'_ia 1 DC? fens e R epr es en-
.1-~-Lt_ion_, 59 N.W.L.Rev. 289, 303 (1965). Ac-
cordingly, courts have been reluctant to 
second-guess the considereci actions of ap-
pcirently gu0lified lawyers, Note, 78 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1434 (1965), and mere improvident 
strategy, bad tactics, mistaken carelessness 
or inexperience do not necessarily amount 
lo ineffective representation. Edwards v. 
y~,$ __ ._, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C.Cir. 1958), cert. 
d~il.~_-9_S}_, 358 U.S. 857 (1958); Tompa v. Vir-· 
~Ji_n_t._0, 331 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1964) Note, 
·1'r1 Ila; v. L. Hev. 1434, ltl-43 (1965). The 
sLa11darc1 to be applied when counsel's ade-
CJUcJCY IL.:.:c> been called into question was 
7 
CiJ cui t Court of l\ppcals said that the right 
to effoctiv~ counscJ. means: 
. not errorless counsel, and 
not counsel judged ineffective by 
hindsight, but counsel reasonably 
likPly to render and rendering_ 
reasonably effective assistance. 
3 81 F • 2 d 61 9 , G 2 5 (5th Cir . 19 6 7) • 
Smo_JJ1erman .:::z_. _Beto_, 276 F .Supp. 579 
(N.D. Tex. 19G7) states the rule as follows: 
When the adequacy of a defense ren-
dered by an attorney is subjected 
to attack the relevant considera-
tion is not whether the case was 
lost where it could have been won, 
but whether counsel stood still and 
did nothing . . to the extent that 
his representation failed to render 
f'_§_~s o_Q_a b J_ y __ e f_ f.~SLUY e ass is tan c e to 
the accused. 276 F.Supp. at 586. 
This court has similarly judged the 
effectiveness of defense counsel accord-
in9 to a rule of reason. In State v. Farns-
~~2r:lJJc, 13 Utah 2d 103, 3G8 P.2d 914 (1962), 
u_ rcpulcibJ0 attorney, during the conduct of 
[; 
l,r. ,3 J 11] ancl a Jlny; he lttc1C:k no opC:'ning state-· 
rur:>11t, failcc1 Lo 0bjccl tu ~he introduction 
of ccrt21j n evidence, and crosf;-·examincd but 
one-' of the prosecu-1 ion witne~~ses. In af-
firrnjng the subsequent convictjon, the court 
quite properly observed: 
The record inclicates no <let ion or 
inaction by the tri21l attorney 
which could not !'_~~[;jQr:ia J ly_ f i_nd 
~~pl~~~-~)-oQ_Jll__-2_JE~.Sli t imu tQ _ exer_-
c i~.§ __ o f _3_:t_r~~~ t=_:qy_. • 3 68 P. 2d 
at 91S . (Ernpha sis aoded.) 
Employing the same analysis, this court 
sj 1;1iJ ar ly dee] a.1:ed defense representation 
to he cffcct:ivc in Stu_~l::~'!-· __ ___1=i_~_gl:?_etter, 17 
Uld1 2r1 :-354, !Jl? P.2d 31/ (1966) and State v. 
j2_~nnt_s_, 14 Utah 2d 404, 38S P. 2d 152 (1963) 
Let us turn to the case at bar. The 
c.:ppeJ J ctnt h0s set forth gener<il and conclu-
' , ..--- • fr ~ • ~:ciry ~1l]€''jccl J_C•ilS O:C J_l1E'_ 1 E:'Cl_J_\'C tr j al repre-
~-i ·, I I ; . ' t -I ~ > 1.J quoting tlic S; I 11 !? fr Cl I ii (' 0) (' S V • 
~) 
e.xlrr- itlc' example of jncffcc-Livc u.ssistance 
of c0u11::_·.cl. Th0sc borrowed allegations, 
however, simply do not fit thc-c instant case. 
In order to show that he has been deprived 
of the effective assistance of counsel, 
appellant must "descend to particulars," 
setting forth specific acts or omissions 
on the part of defense counsel which would 
substantiate the charge of ineffective rep-
resentation. Gilpjn v. U.S., 252 F.2d 685 
(6Lh Cir. 1958). Here, neither the record 
nor appellant's brief suggest any basis for 
the swccpjng allegations of failure properly 
to prepare for trial, failure to advise 
appellant of his rights, failure to elicit 
riktL-Lers of defense, and failure to conduct 
approprjate factual and legal investigations. 
'I'o the contrai_y, the record discloses a 
J () 
, L 1 , r l I J I y l , 1- c p r-i 1 e c 1 c1 e f c n ::__~ e o f a 1 i b i sup --
wiL nr·ssc::.; uncl dc[~c:.iJJd cro~;s-exu.rnination of 
pro:::; ccu t ion \.'it ne s se s. 
l\ppi:c:l12.nt l1ds maoe only two specific 
clurgcs relatin9 to the adequdcy of his de-
fense which are worthy of inquiry. He first 
contends that the failure of counsel to ob-
ject to evidence of the robbery victim's 
identification of appellant from a line-up 
amounted to ineffective representation. In 
support of this charge, appellant alleges 
facts relating to this generdl appearance of 
otlie::i: p2c.:011!'.; in the same line-up. The 
2i1lc9cc1 d.: .c:.r,irniJc:i.rity of appellant and the 
other persons in the line-up is not supported 
b:/ f.:,cL.c o.f record, c:i.nd thus appellant's 
C(it1l cnt ic)n~; in this regard are not properly 
1-,, }_k' cc1:.·;id1:c::r-cd by tl1is courl, for on appeal, 
LI 
appc1 L1nt i~; bound by the tried record and 
lns claim must be CXL't11plifj ed within its 
four con1c~rs. \'Jt:1:u 2, 59 N.W.L.Hev. 289, 
295 (196~>). However, assuming these factual 
allegations to be true, it is clear that 
counsel's failure to elicit such matters 
prior to or during the trial, even if not 
a legitimate exercise of strategy, was not 
prejudicial to appellant. The record is 
clear that the victim identified appellant 
prior to the line-up in question (Tr.31). 
This prior independent identification thus 
renders harmless any alleged error in fail-
ure of counsel to object to the line-up, 
and it is clear that the use of harmless 
error ruJcs is constitutionally permissible 
in adequacy of counsel cases. Note, 78 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1434, 1435 (1965). 
Appellant's second contention, that his 
1.-lc,fcn·;c cou1Y:cl \Jd~; ineffective fen failure 
tc• objccl to hcar~;zrl1 evidence rcg<:irding the:> 
' t • I ' ' t J • Vl_C im s G'LdlE[llCll''c: to a po lCC officer, 
is s irnilar ly v.ri thou l~ mc:>r it. It is well 
recognized that trial strategy often die-
tates that objections to hearsay evidence 
be withheld for a number of reasons. 'I'he 
objection may unduly annoy the jury to the 
defendant's prejudice, or the witness' de-
meanor may be such that allowing him to 
testify will permit the jury to detect in-
consistencies which injure the witness' 
credibility. In the instant case, counsel 
might well have concluded that the hearsay 
evj_c1cnce \--Jd:Cj hannless, so that an objection 
to the tc~;timony would accomplish very lit-
tJc, l:llH1 at tlw risk of prejuc1icing his 
cl_i_cnt. Indeed, thP evidence here' in gues-
tjur1 tuE:1-rlv r0'iterated the e0clicr testimony _, 
13 
oJ tlJ1 vi<:lirn, anc1 th11s coun~:::e:l' s failure 
io object cannot lie c1cu11ed prejudicial to 
J1 is thcJ~cforc apparent 
that counsel's decision not to object to 
this evidence was clearly within the bounds 
of lcgitim:::i_te strategy and in no way may 
be said to amount to ineffective representa-
tion. 
J:>OIN'I' II 
THE CIRCU1'1STJ',NCES SURROUNDING APPEL-
LANT'· S IDENTIFICZ\'I'JON BY THE VICTIM DID NOT 
AMOUN'J' TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS. 
Appe1lant's second point on appeal sets 
forth several ~lJegations relating generally 
to ttie victim's identifjcation of appellant 
as 011'2 of the men who committed the robbery. 
I'it-~;t, it is alleged that the victim ·was un-
c,}!lc: to identify appellant on the night of 
th(' rnbbe:cy. The re cm c1 docs not support 
14 
l [ ' I " r ' 0 I I C l U ~) j 0 l l • l liec're l ,, .~ an ample 
s\ir1'.;_i_n'J t-hat the victim did identify appel-
J;--rni_ at th2 1 t limP fru111 phoL-ographs shown 
to him by the police (H.52,72). 
It is next contended that the victim 
was unilblc to identify appeJlnnt at the 
preliminary hearing. However, a careful 
reading of the record discloses that any 
difficulty encountered at preliminary hear-
ing by the victim in identifying the men 
who robbed him related not to appellant, 
but to appellant's p:coth~r, who was also 
irnplical:ec1 in the robbery. Officer Barton, 
who wa~::; pre~>ent at the preliminary hearing, 
te~;tifiec1 at trial that the victim "was 
not f>urc" as to identifying _pic:;ha_f_cl Montoya 
~t that hearing (R.74). As to whether the 
v:i_ct irn bad any difficulty identifying appel-
) c=1 n L at t ll e pr c J i rn in a 1 y he -:u: in g , 0 f f ice r 
J ,-, 
l»: l J l rn i L cs ti Li ul t llz1 t b c c1 i d not ( n . 7 4) . 
1-i_m idcnL-ificd liirn "J_1011t d rnnci··~~hot photo 
t hrouc:ih coach i llCJ of L h0 pol ice." There is 
noL hiny in the record to suppoJ:t thi::> claim. 
'l'o the cont:rary, the record cJearly shows 
tliat the victim's identification of the 
appelJant, both from pliotoc.=itaphs (R.52,72) 
and a line-up (R.52,73), was positive and 
without hesitation (R.74), and was later 
cor:coborated by the victim's identification 
of appECllant at trial (R. 74) . 
F · lJ 11 t con'ends that the 'ina --Y, appe __ an '-
line··up in which he was identified by the 
victim ~~s prcjudicjol. Again, the record 
discloses the opposite. Detective Barton 
tr~Ljfied at trial that the other p~rsons 
i 1 l l::h e 1 i nE.' ··up 'v\.rc::r e "s imi J <1.r in appear a nee 
to i_lH~ ckfcnc1<'1t1L," (iz.·74), <"n1cl "were all of 
l (, 
_I (1 I \ [ ) " (' :'>\ C (' pt 0 11 C • . who is of dark com-
l ' II p_i ex J_on, (H,73). 
N.Y.2d 958, 286 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1967) and 
in support of his argument that the circum-
stances surrounding the victim's identifi-
cation of him were "highly suggestive of 
a denial of due process." Both cases are 
inupposite to the case at bar. In Ahmed, 
the robbery victim '\'las unable to identify 
the defendant from a police photograph on 
the night of the robbery. But as discussed 
a}>uvc, no sucli failure occurred in the in-
s Le-int cci~;e, where the victim did indeed 
Jd' 11tify the app~lJ ant from photographs, 
<:nid later at a line ·-up. S irtti 1 ci.1:- l y, Big~~ 
\l T'c11nesE:'.ec involved a factuzil background 
c1lli1cly un1iLv Lhcil _lli lli<.:.> case al hand. 
s nr«c__ s eve 11 ruon L 11 ::_~ a f: t er a rape liad be en com-
rnittcd, and the victim's id0ntification of 
sound of the defendant's voice. In addi-
tion, the circumstances surrounding the 
i dent i f i c a. t i o n in .~.i CJ g_t:J-:__~ c 1 e a r 1 y s u g g e s t e d 
qu0~~tionable police practices. In contrast, 
the jnstant case involved not a one-man 
shm1· up seven months u.fter the er ime, but 
instr:.:cJ_d a five··man line-up, composed of 
pPLsons similar in app~arance to appellant, 
conductcJ a mere three days after the rob-
bci:y, It is thus clecir that the case at 
b2( is completely devoid of circu1m3tances 
I 1Lc, tho:-;0 v1hich led to the decision in 
J t3 
CONCI .1 J ~;JO ti 
demonstrate::-~ U1at appclL1nt' s defense was 
conc1uctcc1 by a cornpclc.:11t member of the bar 
1,.;-110 v.1as v1illiny to and did identify himself 
with appellant's intcresb;, and who skill-
fully presented appellant's defense. It 
is equ2lly evident that the victim's iden-
tification of appelJant \vas positive and 
without police coaching. 
'l'he jud9ment of the trial court should 
be affi:r..med. 
RespectfulJy submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Sa]t Lake City, Utah 
l\ l ten ncy!::~ for Respondent 
